Coalition Formation in Parliament

As was discussed in the previous blog entry, common ideology played a key role in coalition formation, and these divisions in ideology could also explain the divisions among the candidates because they derived their platforms from these causes. Prior to the parliamentary elections, coalitions first formed based on regional terms (local versus non-local), and then on more specific terms as with HOPE (help for disadvantaged girls). What is interesting however is how ideology affected coalition formation when candidates did not have common concerns. The Justice League formed based on a catch-all strategy, and this actually created a majority party model that rendered the ideological divisions irrelevant. This can be explained using Alan Ware’s discussion on government formation. By looking at the role of the legislative party, who was responsible for government formation, and finally the goals of those involved, one can then understand why ideology became irrelevant.

Beginning with the role of the legislative party, because the Justice League had two-thirds of the seats in parliament they could be considered the major party. As a result, there was “no viable alternative government because no other parties [could] command the necessary support in the legislature” (Ware 331). Because one party had a working majority this parliamentary system would fall under the majority party model. Furthermore, when new coalitions formed in parliament, every member of the Justice League continued to support the coalition, effectively making the parliament Justice League versus everyone else. This caused a “minority” coalition to form between the members of SOC and HOPE. Despite having different ideologies that proved to affect coalition formation before, the members of these two parties formed a coalition solely out of opposition to the Justice League. This shows why ideological divisions were not important once the parliament was formed.

Second, although parliamentary leaders are significant in coalition formation in the real world, the role of the parliamentary leader was not as significant because of party loyalty established prior to the elections. The main point here is that again, ideology did not play a significant role in ensuring the Justice League’s success because the members of the party had agreed to help each other had they gained control of the parliament. Thus although the parliamentary leader had little power, the Justice League was able to secure even that position because of its super majority in parliament.

All of this relates to the final set of variables affecting coalition formation – goals. As Ware discusses, the goals of government officials includes policy concerns, career goals, and office goals (Ware 332). In terms of career goals, because re-election was not a concern the need to maintain one’s electoral strength was irrelevant, and thus members of parliament do not have to be concerned with their image. This can further explain why the members of SOC and HOPE joined together despite having little in common, because there was no need to maintain an image that they were strict adherents to their own ideologies. In terms of office goals, there were no cabinets or special organizations, so this variable did not apply either. For policy concerns, it is evident that ideology was not significant because the Justice League was able to get all $35 for its causes despite having no common ideology. Furthermore, despite the minority coalition’s attempt to control which charities would receive funding, along ideological differences, the money was not distributed accordingly. This can be seen when the minority coalition attempted to change the bill so Forgotten Harvest would receive $14, because as a local organization that helps children, they felt that this organization was closest to their concerns. The money was given to the highest voted members of the Justice League however, again showing that ideology did not have an effect on the overall spending of the parliament. In conclusion it was the catch-all strategy that allowed for the most power in parliament. This strategy allowed for a majority party model that rendered ideological divisions irrelevant.  

Party Classifications

            To classify the parties present in the class elections, there are three methods of categorization in Alan Ware’s Political Parties and Party Systems; they are based on ideological, membership, and organizational differences. By looking at ideological differences, it is evident that all the parties are similar socially and thus fall under the Social Democratic party family. Further investigation will then reveal regional differences that establish local and non-local divisions, showing how the parties are different. Then in terms of tendency and faction, organizational aspects, the parties can be divided into cadre parties and catch-all parties (the membership aspect discusses party-constituency relations and will not be addressed because party support and activism were not part of the process). By addressing ideological and organizational differences it will be evident that the Justice League is closest to a non-local, catch-all party, whereas the smaller parties are locally-concerned, cadre parties.

            Beginning with party ideology, all the parties are composed of charities and can be classified as Social Democratic. This is because every charity uses donations to improve the lives of the less fortunate. As parties then, the desire to help the less fortunate is parallel to public spending. All the parties also fall into the regional and ethnic party family, but this is where they differ. The Justice League is primarily composed of non-local charities, whereas the remaining parties exclusively support local organizations. The issue however is that Ware discusses regional differences in terms of culture, tradition, and economic interests (39-40). Thus, the local/non-local divide can be explained using economic interests because the debate is in where the money should go. More interestingly, the local/non-local issue can be related to the regional family because of cultural divisions, because most of the minorities in Hon4200 are part of the Justice League, an overall non-local party. This is just a theory however, and there is not enough information to assume that minorities favor one type of regional party over another.

            Second, the parties can be classified on organization. The two types are tendencies and factions, and this influences the size of the parties. Organization based on tendency involves common ideology or “…patterned sets of attitudes found among different members of the party…” (Ware 109).The smaller parties formed based on common ideology, and thus the parties are attributed with specific concerns. This is in comparison to the faction-type organization of the Justice League, where the party is made up of power groups that are together to get votes. These parties may have nothing in common, making it more difficult to see how all of the candidates or charities relate. The benefit however is that such parties have the opportunity to gain more votes because their platform addresses more concerns.

Finally with an understanding of the organization, the parties in class can be designated as either catch-all or cadre parties. Because the Justice League attempts to get votes on multiple concerns, it is catch-all party. This is because it is comprised of several charities that address different concerns like health, nutrition, education, and so on. As a result, the party is large, improving the chances that the party will express concerns everyone has and thus get more votes. The other parties are cadre because they speak to a specific audience and thus alienate other concerns. Although they do not represent elitist concerns, they represent less popular ones, which can be considered similar for this example (because these parties received fewer votes). It can be seen then that these parties have smaller constituencies, and are thus smaller, just like cadre parties.

Campaign Strategy

            My campaign strategy focused on simplicity and easy recognition primarily because I assumed that it would be difficult to persuade or even keep the freshmen interested. I realized this was a concern because I recalled that when I was in their position, I could barely remember what each person was campaigning for. Consequently, it was first important to campaign through simple speeches and flyers to maintain everyone’s attention. Thus our party used YouTube videos as well, in attempts to convey our concerns through a medium that we hoped would be “easier” on the voter than reading a flyer. In picking the videos as well, we focused on shorter, direct videos that got the point across quickly, again for campaigning with simplicity. Keeping it simple was also beneficial because it allowed me to focus more on recognition in my speeches and flyers. In terms of recognition, I focused on promoting my name as well as my party affiliation, with the hopes that the students will recognize my name on the ballot and feel more inclined to vote for me. By picking “The Justice League” as our party name, again we focused on name recognition with the hopes that it will help us get more votes. The only problem here is that the party affiliation is not listed on the ballot, and we could not use The Justice League logo, which may hinder our party’s recognition in comparison to the other parties that have nicer logos. Hopefully this will not affect the voting however.

The United States and the Westminster vs. Consensual Models

            According to Arend Lijphart’s two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy, the United States is one of several outliers because it is a unique mix of the Westminster and Consensual forms of democracy. What is interesting to note however is the fact that the United States still follows the general trends presented; it is the result of British influence and is thus ultimately majoritarian, and at the same time a large country in size, and thus consensual. In addressing the two dimensions specifically, one can see to what degree the United States is classified and address its effectiveness as a democracy. The first dimension (executive-parties) reveals that the United States is considered majoritarian, but because of issues concerning separation of powers, cannot be considered as majoritarian as the United Kingdom (the best representative of the Westminster model as of 2010). In terms of the federal-unitary dimension however, the United States is almost exclusively consensual. Despite having both majoritarian and consensual characteristics, the United States’ form of democracy works well to ensure legitimacy and stability. Where it suffers as a presidential democracy however is in executive-legislative relations. Although gridlock is not an ailment of all presidential democracies, it is an apparent issue in the United States because of this unique combination. Consequently, the United States’ combination of majoritarian and consensual forms of democracy weakens executive dominance to create gridlock, and therefore highlights the need for legislative and executive confidence.

            In order to understand why the United States faces tension between its two dimensions, one must first look at where the United States stands in each aspect. Starting with the executive-parties dimension, it is clear that the United States is ultimately majoritarian. In terms of concentration of executive power, the United States primarily utilizes single-party majority cabinets in accordance with the Westminster model. The United States also is primarily a two-party system (despite the presence of other smaller parties), majoritarian in its electoral systems, as well as competitive and pluralist in relation to interest groups; all of which further its classification with the Westminster model. Where the United States differs however is primarily in its separation of powers between the executive and legislatives branches, diminishing executive dominance. This promotes the system of checks and balances that is established through the federal-unitary dimension of democracy.

            By next looking at how the United States places in the federal-unitary dimension, one can then see why it conflicts with the executive-parties dimension. The United States is classified primarily as consensual in this respect, because of its constitutional rigidity, strong centralized judicial review, strong federalism, bicameralism, and independent central bank. The issue here however is that through bicameralism tension occurs between the executive and legislative branches that promotes gridlock. This is because in having two houses with symmetrical powers, but incongruence in composition, a legislature can result that opposes the president because these representatives are elected by popular vote as well. Consequently aspects other than the concern for reelection are needed to promote compromise.

The best way to solve this gridlock issue is to grant both the president and legislative branches confidence powers in addition to the recall powers of the electorate. The reason why both branches of government should be able to motion for no confidence is because it ensures that the two branches will more effectively compromise in attempts to remain in government. There is concern however that giving either branch powers to call for reelection would hurt the legitimacy of popular election, in that granting elected officials the power to remove the very representatives people vote for would hinder the political process. This is not the case however because by giving the electorate the ability to call for recall elections, they too have confidence powers. Similarly, if one of the branches was able to successfully vote for no confidence, then the electorate should still be able to vote those they voted for before, ensuring that only officials unwilling to compromise be removed from government positions. By granting such powers, fear of being removed from government would drive cooperation and compromise between parties, and help prevent gridlock. 

Open List PR

            Currently, the possible electoral systems in question include Alternative Vote, Simple Transferable Vote, Closed List, and Open List Proportional Representation. Although every system attempts to guarantee the voter’s voice, open list PR is still the most proportional. By comparing open list PR with the other systems, one can see that it is proportional, preferential, and simple, and thus better suited to our conditions because we not only have a small parliament, but an electorate that should theoretically be as diverse as our class is in terms of political ideology.

            Beginning with the AV system, although it usually allows every voter to get what they want (although it may be a lesser preference – second, third, etc.), it removes the lowest vote-getters making the system less proportional. AV systems establish majority groups, but fail to represent minorities adequately. This is why open list PR is better than AV because although it may establish a majority, the system itself does not alienate minority interests. Similarly, closed list PR is not adequate because although it may be proportional, it too can remove choice because it doesn’t give the voter any preference in voting.

            In contrast STV, like open list PR, is one of the few systems that grants voter preference in elections because of its candidate-based nature. STV relies more heavily on candidates than does open list PR, because voters can select candidates across party lines, whereas in open list PR the voter ranks candidates within one party. Although these candidates still compete with each other within these parties, they are still promoting similar ideas parallel to the party’s interests. Although this is the same for STV, it is more difficult to do so because the voter can still pick from all of the candidates. Thus open list PR is provides preference while still exhibiting simplicity. Also, in terms of parliament size, it is known that increasing the number of seats increases proportionality. Since our parliament only has nine seats, it is beneficial to use a simple system that relies more on party ideals than on individuality, thus making it easier for the voter. By doing so, although one candidate may not make it into parliament, voters can still pick other candidates listed under the party and are theoretically be guaranteed to have their interests represented. This highlights another concern of STV regarding coalition formation before and after elections. As with our example, because there is no electoral accountability in terms of voter-candidate relations, those elected can form coalitions that do not coincide with electorate interests, and thus there is no check on those elected under the STV system. That is why open list PR would be the best option, because it is proportional, while ensuring representation of all interests through its simplicity in use of parties.   

Blog Post #3

In order to understand how one can take action to be successful in a two-round system as it pertains to our class elections, it is imperative to first establish and then analyze the differences between the Roulette, First-Past-The Post, and Two-Round systems. Broader analysis of these differences will suggest various methods for success in the Two-Round system, which includes the formation of coalitions, degree of opposition, and campaigning.

First, in order to understand why changes occurred in voting between the three systems, one must look at the change itself. Starting with the roulette system, it is important to note that with 14 different organizations, representing each person in the class, each organization only received one vote. As opposed to the other two systems, this system allowed for larger candidacy (more organizations), thus reducing the potential for any one organization to win. In comparing the roulette with the FPTP systems, the latter involved fewer candidates as well as coalitions, effectively reducing the options in our election. To take it further, in comparison to the FPTP system the two-round system exhibits an even further reduction in coalitions voted for, signaling an increasing divide between forming majority and minority groups. Also worth noting is the fact that although the number of votes cast between the FPTP and two-round systems is the same, the coalition that won under the FPTP system did not win under the first round of the two-round system. This indicates changes in voter preference as illustrated by the two coalitions that did not receive votes, as well as the fact that all other groups’ votes remained constant. For both the FPTP and two-round systems as well, the coalitions that received the most votes address local issues, as discussed in various campaign speeches. These are the differences that denote attention, and by analyzing the reasons for their appearance, one can then formulate a strategy for success in the two-round system.

In first looking at the roulette example, one can see that there was no interest in voting for other organizations. Although cooperation would have been beneficial, it would still only allow for one person’s ideas to be represented. Thus, the roulette system is the embodiment of personal viewpoint; it highlights the diversity in thought and desire that creates the need for compromise, but does not guarantee it. By looking at the FPTP and two-round systems, however, one can see that there is organization of ideas. This is because as opposed to the roulette system, where the person elected controls what will be debated and therefore has an inherent advantage in being selected, the pluralitarian systems theoretically place all candidates on equal ground. Thus, because there is no establishment of authority in these systems prior to election, it is encouraged that people coalesce. In addition, upon introducing a second round of pluralitarian elections in the two-round system, it further promotes coalitions because the entity must be able to survive two elections in the face of changing perspectives and support, thus denoting the need for a large platform of issues and therefore a larger coalition. Although this concept was not as prevalent in our elections, one can see that, in terms of the local preferences, the coalition with more local organizations (SOC) beat the other local coalition (HAG).

 Next, in terms of opposition, it is important to note that with progression through the electoral systems we have used thus far, with this increasing stress on coalitions, the number of candidates to choose from diminishes significantly (especially between the roulette and FPTP systems). Whereas in the FPTP elections all six of the coalitions received votes, in the two-round system only four did. This is because our two-round elections took place right after our FPTP elections, thus establishing SOC as the majority group. As such, either opposition to SOC, or an interest in voting for a group that actually has the potential to win, would motivate supporters of the other two coalitions to vote for HAG. Therefore, it can be seen that with a quantitative decrease in opposition, votes will tend to transfer to other groups to alter the outcomes of an election. Finally, one of the greatest reasons HAG was able to win the first round of the two-round elections is because of campaigning. Campaigning played a key role in establishing the differences between the systems because, as closely tied with levels of opposition, as the number of coalitions campaigning increases, it becomes more difficult to select a group to support. This trend can again be seen with the progression of our elections, where as the number of groups campaigning decreased, the number of votes per said coalitions increased. This again may also reflect a lack of choice among voters that must pick between a few groups.

For my organization, it is important to address action pertaining to coalition, opposition, and campaigning concerns as well.  It is first and foremost imperative that I form a coalition with organizations that are not only local, but also will allow for our group to encompass many ideas and causes. Because forming coalitions will diminish the level of opposition for the main groups, it is also in my organization’s best interest to divide causes such that voters will be forced to pick from a larger candidacy, and therefore split their votes. Finally, it is essential that I campaign more heavily, because it reminds voters as to what my coalition stands for, and possibly sway undecided voters in my favor.  

Roulette Versus Pluralitarian Systems

In comparing the roulette and pluralitarian electoral systems, one can see that they are both simple systems that contain the framework for legitimacy through the decisions of the majority. The issue that arises however, especially in relation to our in-class elections, is the method through which decisions are made. The roulette system, based on chance selection, is an indiscriminate form of choosing people or ideas, thus theoretically promoting proportional representation in its elections. The roulette system requires frequency of elections to warrant proportional representation however, and since this system allows for one person to choose the topics of discussion that will then be debated, as opposed to the pluralitarian system where voters are presented with a variety of ideas to choose from, it will ultimately hurt my organization’s chances of receiving funds more. Thus, the roulette system is limiting in nature, because it silences topics of discussion right from the start. Therefore, by looking at how both the roulette and pluralitarian systems address majority and minority concerns, the formation of coalitions, and the subsequent perceived legitimacy of the system, one can then see how the pluralitarian system would be more beneficial for getting my organization funding.

First, let us look at the roulette system with respect to these aspects. The roulette system is built to empower those elected from the beginning because it forces us to make decisions based on their desires, rather than that of the majority. With our example however, Eric and Adina still chose to include every organization in the debate when they very well could have formulated a discussion and voting method around their organizations, or at least, created some advantage for their organizations as the professor suggested. Because everyone is working to advance their own organizations, there are then 15 separate groups, or basically 15 minorities, and everyone’s chances of being selected are equal. As a result, relying on chance would not be an adequate means to action because each person would orient the agenda toward their own goals. In addition, each person would theoretically vote for their own organization, and no organization would win. It can thus be inferred that the system promotes alliances in order for anyone to succeed, where coercion would then come into play. In addition, it is important to note as mentioned above, that this system is built upon the idea that elections are frequent – thus justifying why the elections are random –because they enable a different person to present concerns each time. As a result then, theoretically the person that is picked will present concerns that coincide with that of the majority. Thus, although this system empowers those elected from the beginning, it is inherently legitimate, because everyone has an equal chance to set the agenda. With our example however, because we only did it once, we consequently increased every organization’s stake in the vote. And since we are forced to make decisions based on the desires of those elected, rather than majority concerns, this system is therefore not adequate for our purposes. This is why the pluralitarian system would be better in getting my organization funding.

The pluralitarian system also uses the majority to make decisions, but often includes all concerns right from the beginning. As opposed to the roulette system, this system encourages the presentation of a variety of viewpoints, but often hinders the success of minorities to a certain degree. As mentioned previously, the roulette system could actually elect someone of a minority position; the pluralitarian system is still better however, because it is easier for the minority to align with larger groups, and include their own concerns in a party’s extensive stance, rather than the opposite. Therefore this system also involves coalitions. Although the same thing can occur with the roulette system, the pluralitarian system is more efficient for both majorities, and minorities, because it allows for minority issues to tag along with major concerns. At the same time, it also protects the majority from minority powers over the agenda guaranteed in the roulette system. This system would thus develop a better perception of legitimacy because everyone’s views can be included in discussion from the beginning, and because coalitions provide ways for everyone to advance their interests. One of the problems that arises with this system however, is the tendency toward polarization, which creates a majoritarian system instead, as seen with that of the United States.

The electoral system in the United States is a pluralitarian system based on two major parties, also known as a majoritarian system, and it is through this setup that one can see that the negative consequences outweigh the positive. This system focuses on the decisions, as well as concerns, of the majority right from the beginning, just like the pluralitarian system. This is the greatest positive consequence, because it promotes parties to create inclusive party platforms. The biggest problem here however is that in the United States, this two-party system has evolved to solidify party stances, constricting the platforms to be as inclusive of party members as possible. Thus the best aspect of this system is also its worst. As a result of attempts to maximize on constituency votes, this two-party system alienates minority groups because it disproportionately selects the views of the two main parties. The polarization promotes a proportional representation among these two parties however, which then creates gridlock. As a result, we are left with a system that represents only the two main opposing views adequately, and at the same time fails to promote compromise between them.