The United States and the Westminster vs. Consensual Models

            According to Arend Lijphart’s two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy, the United States is one of several outliers because it is a unique mix of the Westminster and Consensual forms of democracy. What is interesting to note however is the fact that the United States still follows the general trends presented; it is the result of British influence and is thus ultimately majoritarian, and at the same time a large country in size, and thus consensual. In addressing the two dimensions specifically, one can see to what degree the United States is classified and address its effectiveness as a democracy. The first dimension (executive-parties) reveals that the United States is considered majoritarian, but because of issues concerning separation of powers, cannot be considered as majoritarian as the United Kingdom (the best representative of the Westminster model as of 2010). In terms of the federal-unitary dimension however, the United States is almost exclusively consensual. Despite having both majoritarian and consensual characteristics, the United States’ form of democracy works well to ensure legitimacy and stability. Where it suffers as a presidential democracy however is in executive-legislative relations. Although gridlock is not an ailment of all presidential democracies, it is an apparent issue in the United States because of this unique combination. Consequently, the United States’ combination of majoritarian and consensual forms of democracy weakens executive dominance to create gridlock, and therefore highlights the need for legislative and executive confidence.

            In order to understand why the United States faces tension between its two dimensions, one must first look at where the United States stands in each aspect. Starting with the executive-parties dimension, it is clear that the United States is ultimately majoritarian. In terms of concentration of executive power, the United States primarily utilizes single-party majority cabinets in accordance with the Westminster model. The United States also is primarily a two-party system (despite the presence of other smaller parties), majoritarian in its electoral systems, as well as competitive and pluralist in relation to interest groups; all of which further its classification with the Westminster model. Where the United States differs however is primarily in its separation of powers between the executive and legislatives branches, diminishing executive dominance. This promotes the system of checks and balances that is established through the federal-unitary dimension of democracy.

            By next looking at how the United States places in the federal-unitary dimension, one can then see why it conflicts with the executive-parties dimension. The United States is classified primarily as consensual in this respect, because of its constitutional rigidity, strong centralized judicial review, strong federalism, bicameralism, and independent central bank. The issue here however is that through bicameralism tension occurs between the executive and legislative branches that promotes gridlock. This is because in having two houses with symmetrical powers, but incongruence in composition, a legislature can result that opposes the president because these representatives are elected by popular vote as well. Consequently aspects other than the concern for reelection are needed to promote compromise.

The best way to solve this gridlock issue is to grant both the president and legislative branches confidence powers in addition to the recall powers of the electorate. The reason why both branches of government should be able to motion for no confidence is because it ensures that the two branches will more effectively compromise in attempts to remain in government. There is concern however that giving either branch powers to call for reelection would hurt the legitimacy of popular election, in that granting elected officials the power to remove the very representatives people vote for would hinder the political process. This is not the case however because by giving the electorate the ability to call for recall elections, they too have confidence powers. Similarly, if one of the branches was able to successfully vote for no confidence, then the electorate should still be able to vote those they voted for before, ensuring that only officials unwilling to compromise be removed from government positions. By granting such powers, fear of being removed from government would drive cooperation and compromise between parties, and help prevent gridlock. 

Open List PR

            Currently, the possible electoral systems in question include Alternative Vote, Simple Transferable Vote, Closed List, and Open List Proportional Representation. Although every system attempts to guarantee the voter’s voice, open list PR is still the most proportional. By comparing open list PR with the other systems, one can see that it is proportional, preferential, and simple, and thus better suited to our conditions because we not only have a small parliament, but an electorate that should theoretically be as diverse as our class is in terms of political ideology.

            Beginning with the AV system, although it usually allows every voter to get what they want (although it may be a lesser preference – second, third, etc.), it removes the lowest vote-getters making the system less proportional. AV systems establish majority groups, but fail to represent minorities adequately. This is why open list PR is better than AV because although it may establish a majority, the system itself does not alienate minority interests. Similarly, closed list PR is not adequate because although it may be proportional, it too can remove choice because it doesn’t give the voter any preference in voting.

            In contrast STV, like open list PR, is one of the few systems that grants voter preference in elections because of its candidate-based nature. STV relies more heavily on candidates than does open list PR, because voters can select candidates across party lines, whereas in open list PR the voter ranks candidates within one party. Although these candidates still compete with each other within these parties, they are still promoting similar ideas parallel to the party’s interests. Although this is the same for STV, it is more difficult to do so because the voter can still pick from all of the candidates. Thus open list PR is provides preference while still exhibiting simplicity. Also, in terms of parliament size, it is known that increasing the number of seats increases proportionality. Since our parliament only has nine seats, it is beneficial to use a simple system that relies more on party ideals than on individuality, thus making it easier for the voter. By doing so, although one candidate may not make it into parliament, voters can still pick other candidates listed under the party and are theoretically be guaranteed to have their interests represented. This highlights another concern of STV regarding coalition formation before and after elections. As with our example, because there is no electoral accountability in terms of voter-candidate relations, those elected can form coalitions that do not coincide with electorate interests, and thus there is no check on those elected under the STV system. That is why open list PR would be the best option, because it is proportional, while ensuring representation of all interests through its simplicity in use of parties.